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In outlook as in name, the philosophers of the Deep Ecology Movement acknowledge a 
debt to the science of context. Ecology’s “skin out” perspective (contrasted with 
physiology’s “skin in” reductionist insights) directs attention to the importance of a 
peripheral world and the “circumstances” of things. The implications correct an ancient 
mistake, broadening and deepening philosophy. “Philosophy has traditionally refused to 
acknowledge or directly face up to the physical existence of Earth . . . [and now] is 
philosophy’s opportunity to rectify its greatest error: the rejection of the natural world as 
it is experienced concretely in real life” (Hargrove 1989). 
Seventy years ago the same opinion was expressed by Will Durant (1926) and time has 
deepened his meaning: “Philosophy . . . must stay on Earth and earn its keep by 
illuminating life” (emphasis added). Here is the call for a true empiricism that values and 
embraces the reality of an animated Earth with all its aesthetic resonances, a call that 
ecology echoes. In this sense Naess, Sessions, Drengson, and others of their persuasion, 
are articulating a Deep Philosophy with ecological overtones, a new philosophy that 
opposes the abstract shallowness of the old (see Drengson & Inoue 1995, for basic 
references to the literature of Deep Ecology ecosophy and its exponents). 
As with every body of knowledge that parades under the prestigious banner of “science,” 
ecology is limited in its ability to reveal the qualitative and the normative. Nevertheless 
values are expressed at the paradigmatic level—in theories, hypotheses and major 
concepts—where the greatest possibilities for synergy with philosophy lie and where, 
incidentally, scientists can make ethical choices as to their fundamental faiths, favoring a 
competitive view of the world or a synecologic-symbiotic world-view. 
In this article I propose to turn a critical and immodestly personal searchlight on ecology 
and on the beliefs of some of its practitioners, thereby illuminating indirectly several 
shadowy aspects of Deep Philosophy. For example, from the perspective of ecology, how 
are we to understand “life?” Does a concern with “biodiversity” go far enough? What do 
the terms “ecosystem” and “ecocentric” mean? For that matter, what is “ecology?” The 
term itself needs clarification because “ecology” can be understood as both scientific 
viewpoint and as field-of-study. Although this starting point may seem irrelevant, 
preliminary brush clearing is necessary if questions such as those above are to be 
examined in the light of an ecological Weltanschauung. 
Scientific Viewpoints and Ecology 
The “what, how, where and when” questions familiar to public speakers have been 
formalized by biologists into seven incommensurate “points of view” applicable to the 
study of organisms and other physical objects (Rowe 1961). These are morphology and 
anatomy (“what is its form, from the outside and from the inside?”), physiology and 
ecology (“how does it work, and what are its interactions with what surrounds it?”), 
chorology and chronology (“where is it in space, and what is its development through 
time?”), and systematic or taxonomy (“who are its relatives?”). All other queries can be 
shown to be variants or combinations of the above. For example, questions about 
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structure and composition are anatomical; questions about genetics and genesis are 
physiological-chronological. The “why” question, positing purpose, is not asked although 
it lies hidden in the ecological outlook. 
Physiology and ecology are the twin functional or process-oriented viewpoints earlier 
referred to as “skin in” (inward looking) and “skin out” (outward looking). When 
questioned, the natural-born physiologist says, “I’ll look into it; in/quire, in/vestigate;” 
the natural born ecologist says, “I’ll find out about it; ex/amine, ex/plore.” To “find out 
about” any object in the ecological sense calls up one of two different methodological 
approaches. In the first, the object to be studied is maintained at the center of interest as a 
unity opposed to an unorganized “factored” environment of light, heat, moisture, 
nutrients, and other provisions. This is the approach of traditional biological ecology, 
focused on organisms functioning in “resource” habitats. Its mirror image in social 
thinking is “resourcism,” a narrow focus on humans as the center of a fragmented world, 
surrounded by stacks of God-given though imperfect assets crying out for development, 
management, stewardship. 
In the second methodology the object is conceptualized as a functional part of more 
inclusive levels of organization, as an active constituent of larger unities which to some 
extent guide and constrain its activities. The appropriate physiological question is still the 
reductionist, “How does this thing function?” But the appropriate ecological question is 
holistic: “What is this thing’s function (role, niche, purpose) within the larger system that 
comprehends it? Here the ecological viewpoint places each “system” (such as a cell, an 
organ, an organism or any terrarium-like or aquarium-like piece of Earth) as a subset of a 
larger enveloping “system” wherein the relationship is that of part to whole, of thing to 
the larger medium that encapsulates it. This second viewpoint is more recent than the first 
and less popular in academic circles, its purview broader than organisms and Biology 
Departments. Diffused into social thinking it conveys supportive though nebulous ideas 
about the importance of “community,” “ecosystem” and “biosphere” concepts that evoke 
the other dimension of “ecology,” viz. its subject matter. 
Ecology as Fields of Study 
Open most ecology textbooks and the “fields of study” judged legitimate are exposed. 
Usually first attention is paid to individual organisms (autecology), then to species and 
groups of similar individuals (population ecology), then all organisms found occupying 
the same milieu (community ecology) and finally at the end of the book the ecosystem as 
“community plus abiotic resources” or “community plus environment.” 
In parentheses, the textbooks of Eugene Odum are an exception. As early as 1953 he 
defined ecology as “the study of the structure and function of nature” and accorded first 
place to the discussion of ecosystems: “the largest functional units in ecology.” Despite 
his statement that “the entire biosphere may be one vast ecosystem,” few ecologists 
accepted the logic of “whole systems.” The fact of complexity in the subject matter, plus 
the academic necessity of focusing on simple problems that bring quick dividends to the 
individual in the form of papers judged publishable by peers, has ruled against it. Hence 
whole journals of ecological research are devoted to articles on communities and 
populations, the latter justified and enhanced by redefining “function” as Darwinian 
“adaptation.” 
The prevalent concept of ecosystem continues to be “community plus environment” with 
research focused on the utilitarian aspects of organisms, or the effects of organisms on 
such “resources” as soil and water: Do the bomb’s radio-nuclides end up in the food 
chain and in people? How much photosynthate (net primary production) can be harvested 
from land and water? What is the sediment load and water yield from forested versus 
non-forested watersheds and how can water yield be increased by manipulating 
vegetation? Both Hagen (1992) and Golley (1993) have traced the development since 
Darwin’s time of the idea of ecosystem as a unit of nature characterized by energy flow, 
nutrient cycling, successional stages and productivity, noting how the practical concerns 
of the military and various other branches of government spurred the funding of 
ecosystem research. That ecosystems might be more than serviceable “functional” entities 
consisting of organisms (important) plus an energy-providing and nutrient-providing 
environment (relatively unimportant) has never been seriously considered in ecological 
science. 
When arrived at by summation, the ecosystem concept can be anything, everything or, to 
some academics, nothing. The error is in the additive approach, building from individual 
to population to community and, finally, to ecosystem which emerges as last in order of 
importance, a so-called “convenient artifice” or “heuristic device” vaguely 
complementing and extending the biotic community compared to which it is less “real.” 
On a more sophisticated level, Lovelock (1988) and Margulis (1995) have attempted to 
build the “living world” out of bacteria, rather than bacteria out of a living world. Again 
the . priori biological, organism-centered bias is evident. The planet and its sectoral parts 
whose air, land and water comprise every creature’s evolutionary source and outer 
supportive matrix (matrix-mater-womb-mother) gets short shrift. 
Earth-Sector Ecosystems 
Suppose that the importance of Earth relative to organisms had been earlier recognized. 
Then four hundred years of science might have been devoted to understanding the 
grandest system with which humans are in direct contact: the planetary ecosphere. 
Examination from the physiological viewpoint, asking “How does it function; how does it 
work?” would have required a mental anatomizing of Earth in order to honor its 
magnificent complexity and to understand its structure-composition, because anatomy is 
the clue to function. As the word per-form-ance suggests, function is what form does over 
time; function is literally “read” from things happening. Scientists have today arrived at 
the global question of Earth’s performance, prodded by the Gaia hypothesis and such 
research programs as the International Geophysical-Biological Program. But the question 
remains: At the sub-global level, what “mental anatomizing,” what divisions of the 
ecosphere are relevant to such air-breathing, water-drinking, food-eating and land-
dwelling creatures as we? The logical answer is sectors of the ecosphere at any chosen 
scale: air above land-water with organisms clustered where the gas, liquid and solid 
phases interface (Rowe 1992). This, in the words of Leopold (1949) with the addition of 
air-atmosphere that neither he nor the Bible’s genesis story recognizes—is the “land 
community” to which humans belong. The more inclusive term is “terrestrial ecosystem” 
and the key to its logical definition and mapping lies in Earth’s landforms and water 
forms (Bailey in press). 
By this route an explicit and tangible concept of ecosystem is derived by division of the 
ecosphere “from the top down,” as compared to the diffuse and variable concept obtained 
by addition “from the bottom up.” “Top down” division yields Earth-centered units of 
nature, surmounting the conventional organism-centered biocentricity of the “bottom up” 
approach. It engenders geoecosystems that are substantial as well as functional, rather 
than inexplicit bio-ecosystems (Rowe & Barnes 1994). It gives substance and real-world 
meaning to terms such as “ecodiversity” and “ecocentrism.” 
A second line of logic also leads to the idea of ecosystems as variable size-scaled sectors 
of the ecosphere. Suppose the reality of the world is conceived as systems within systems 
in a hierarchy of containment, like fitted Chinese boxes or Russian dolls within dolls. One 
starts at some low level, say a functional cell, observing that its inner structural parts are 
joined or articulated in such a way that it metabolizes and thus maintains itself (by 
autopoiesis, literally “self-making”). The cell’s enclosing functional system is the 
metabolizing tissue, in turn enclosed in the metabolizing organ and this in turn in the 
metabolizing organism. Note that each autopoietic level of integration is composed of 
lower levels and is itself a part of higher levels; each level has a physiology that refers to 
its constituent levels below and an ecology that relates it to the levels above. 
Now ask, what is the entity above the organism that analogously shows articulated 
structure, that functions metabolically and exhibits autopoiesis? Logic points to 
volumetric place-specific ecosystems. Why not community or population? Because 
neither is a fully functional (metabolic) entity; neither exhibits articulated structure nor 
autopoiesis. As aggregates, communities and populations can be counted, classified and 
to some extent studied as interbreeding individuals—which is their practical use—but 
they are more abstract than organisms and geographic ecosystems; they are taxonomic 
categories based, respectively, on juxtaposition in space and membership in a particular 
species or sub-species. The population of a particular species or sub-species trading 
genetic material can be a center of interest to evolutionary biologists but it can never be a 
center of understanding when bereft of its sustaining ecosystem. Therefore, the level of 
integration above organism is the Earth space that surrounds and includes it (singly or 
with its shared population and community members); i.e. the sector of the ecosphere that 
includes and supports organisms, the internally articulated air-soil-water-organism “geo-
ecosystem” that miraculously generates and maintains life. 
To summarize thus far: the most “real” or least “abstract” fields-of-study that logic 
reveals, are the organism (within its surrounding ecosystem) and the ecosystem (within 
its larger surrounding ecosystem), each of the latter a complete piece of dynamic Earth at 
some geographic place. Ecosystems so conceived can be esteemed and studied from the 
seven scientific viewpoints previously listed. Not so for populations and communities. 
They lack the internal articulation and hence the structural-functional attributes of 
metabolizing autopoietic beings. Communities of creatures, including humans, are 
“brought to life” only by including with them the sustaining Earth-matrix of air, 
landform, soil and water; i.e. by conceiving them as organic parts of the holistic realities 
that are ecosystems. 
Implicit here is a devastating criticism of sociology and communitarian politics that will 
“improve” the human condition by sole attention to populations, societies and social ills. 
Alarmed by the fact that the barbarians are not hammering on the frontier walls but are 
already here governing us, Macintyre (1981) called for “new forms of community” to 
sustain the moral life and “survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness.” Such 
fervent hopes seemed realizable before the Age of Ecology. But now we know that 
groups of like-minded people banded together—the traditional community—cannot make 
it alone. The community with survival value can never again be conceived as a people-
only free-standing entity, able to weather the storms generated by humanistic arrogance. 
Only Earth ecosystems in which humans are cooperating, serving parts can achieve long-
term health and sustainability. 
Where Does “Life” Reside? 
The hierarchical series organ-organism-ecosystem-ecosphere represents a scale of 
increasing complexity and creativity. The last member, the ecosphere, is the leading 
candidate for embodiment of the organizing principle called “life.” What gives life to the 
cell? The living organ that is its surrounding environment. What give life to the organ? 
The living organism within which it is embodied. What gives life to the organism? The 
surrounding living ecosystem and the global ecosphere. 
The October ’94 issue of Scientific American, titled “Life in the Universe,” presented a 
state-of-the-art account of how planet Earth and organic earthlings—creaturely relatives 
and ourselves—came to be. Throughout the text the words “organisms” and “life” were 
used as synonyms. Two contributors made a stab at clarifying what the second concept 
might or might not mean. Robert Kates suggested that “life is simply organic matter 
capable of reproducing itself,” or “the mix of living things that fill the places we are 
familiar with.” More circumspect, Carl Sagan was content to falsify current definitions, 
implying that a satisfactory meaning for “life” has yet to be found. 
Organisms can be “alive” one moment and “dead” the next with no quantitative 
difference. The recently deceased organism has lost none of its physical parts yet it lacks 
“life”—an unknown quality of organization (perhaps that mystery called “energy?”) but 
not the organization itself. A still stronger reason exists for not equating “life” and 
“organisms.” The latter only exhibit “aliveness” in the context of life-supporting systems, 
though curiously the vitality of the latter has mostly been denied. By analogy, it is as if all 
agreed that only a tree trunk’s cambial layer is “alive” while its support system—the 
tree’s bole and roots of bark and wood that envelops and supports the cambium—is 
“dead.” Instead we perceive the whole tree as “alive.” 
The separation of “living” organisms from their supportive but “dead” environments is a 
reductionist convention that ecology disproves. Both organic and inorganic are functional 
parts of enveloping ecosystems, of which the largest one accessible to direct experience is 
the global ecosphere. To attribute the organizing principle “life” to Earth—to the 
ecosphere and its sectoral aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems—makes more sense than 
attempting to locate it in organisms per se, divorced from their requisite milieus. The 
aquatic ecologist Lindeman (1942) who pioneered examination of lakes as energetic 
systems adopted the ecosystem concept because of the blurred distinction between 
“living” and “dead” in the components of the Minnesota lakes he studied. 
The Biological Fallacy, equating organisms with life, is the result of a faulty inside-the-
system view (Rowe 1991). Pictures of the blue-and-white planet Earth taken from the 
outside are intuitively recognized as images of a living “cell.” Inside that “cell,” cheated 
by sight, people perceive a particulate world separable into important and unimportant 
parts: the “organic” and the “inorganic,” “biotic” and “abiotic,” “animate” and 
“inanimate,” “living” and “dead.” Religions, philosophies and sciences have been 
constructed around these ignorant taxonomies, perpetuating the departmentalization of a 
global ecosystem whose “aliveness” is as much expressed in its improbable atmosphere, 
crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. When did life begin? When did 
any kind of creative organization begin? Perhaps when the ecosphere came into 
existence. Perhaps earlier at time zero and the Big Bang. 
Important human attitudes hinge on the idea of life and where it resides. If only 
organisms are imbued with life, then things like us are important and all else is relatively 
unimportant. The biocentric preoccupation with organisms subtly supports 
anthropocentrism, for are we not first in neural complexity among all organisms? Earth 
has traditionally been thought to consist of consequential entities—organisms, living 
beings—and their relatively inconsequential dead environments. What should be attended 
to, cared for, worried about? The usual answer today is “life” in its limited sense of 
“organisms,” of biodiversity. Meanwhile sea, land and air—classified as dead 
environment—can be freely exploited. In the reigning ideology as long as large 
organisms are safeguarded, anything goes. 
We demean Earth by equating “life” and “organisms,” then proving by text-book 
definition that Earth is dead because not-an-organism. In this way mental doors are barred 
against the idea of liveliness everywhere. Certainly Earth is not an organism, nor is it a 
super organism as Lovelock has proposed, any more than organisms are Earth or mini-
Earth. The planetary ecosphere and its sectoral volumetric ecosystems are SUPRA-
organismic, higher levels of integration than mere organisms. Essential to the ecocentric 
idea is assignment of highest value to the ecosphere and to the ecosystems that it 
comprises. 
Note the use of “ecosphere” rather than “biosphere,” the latter usually defined as a “life-
filled” (read “organism-filled”) thin shell at Earth’s surface. The meaning of “ecosphere” 
goes deeper; it is Earth to the core, comprising the totality of gravity and electro-
magnetic fields, the molten radioactive magma that shifts the crustal plates, vulcanism 
and earthquakes and mountain building that renew nutrients at the surface, the whole 
dynamic evolving “stage” where organisms play out their many roles under the guidance 
of the larger whole, shaped at least in part by the “morphic fields” of the living Gaia 
(Sheldrake 1991:162). 
In different times and places the source of life has been attributed to the air, to soil, to 
water, to fire, as well as to organisms. As with the blind men touching the elephant, each 
separate part has been the imagined essential component of the whole Earth. Now that the 
planet has been conceptualized as one integrated entity, can we not logically attribute the 
creative synthesizing quintessence called “life” to it, rather than to any one class of its 
various parts? 
When life is conceived as a function of the ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystem the 
subject matter of Biology is cast in a bright new light. The pejorative concept of 
“environment” vanishes. The focus of vital interest broadens to encompass the world. 
Anthropocentrism and biocentrism receive the jolting shock they deserve. The answer as 
to where our preservation emphasis should center is answered: Earth spaces (and all that 
is in them) first, Earth species second. This priority guarantees no loss of vital parts. 
The implications of locating animation where it belongs, of denying the naive “Life = 
Organisms” equation, are many. Perhaps most important is a broadening of the 
Schweizerian “reverence for life” to embrace the whole Earth. Reverence for life means 
reverence for ecosystems. We should feel the same pain when the atmosphere and the 
seas are poisoned as when people are poisoned. We should feel more pain at the 
destruction of wild ecosystems, such as the temperate rain forest of the West Coast, than 
at the demise of any organism, no matter how sad the latter occasion, because the 
destruction of ecosystems severs the very roots of evolutionary creativity. 
System Hierarchies and Purpose 
In 1950 von Bertalanffy outlined General Systems Theory, stating that “Reality in the 
modern conception appears as a tremendous hierarchical order of organized entities.. . . 
Unity of Science is granted, not by a utopian reduction of all sciences to physics and 
chemistry, but by the structural uniformities of the different levels of reality.” Thus the 
structural similarities of the many different subordinate and superordinate systems makes 
possible the formulation and deduction of principles valid for systems in general. 
Consider now the proposed organized hierarchical systems-within-systems: the 
ecosphere, the geographic ecosystem, the organism, organ, tissue and cell. All such 
hierarchies are abstract conceptual schemes devised by humans and imposed on nature, 
and clear thinking demands that the different levels be coherent and congruous. Medawar 
(1967), the Nobel laureate, criticized Arthur Koestler for building an illogical hierarchy 
of “holons” from non-homogeneous elements; shaky logic of this kind, he said, can be 
mischievous. Note that the proposed hierarchy is one of containment, logically consistent 
in that it embodies three-dimensional, internally structured objects which are different 
levels of integration related as wholes and parts. Populations and communities are 
excluded to avoid Medawar’s criticism. 
The philosopher Feibleman (1954) attempted to systematize the structural uniformities 
and inter-relationships of systems in hierarchies. One of his pertinent “laws of the levels:” 
The mechanism of any level is found at lower levels (the parts), while the 
purpose of any level is found at levels above (the wholes). 
Consider an organ, such as the human heart. Its mechanism (how does it function?) is 
found anatomically and physiologically through the tissues and cells of which it is 
composed and what they do (contract, expand, etc.) Its purpose (what is its function?) is 
found ecologically by reference to the role it plays in the human body of which it is an 
essential part. In today’s society, where mastery and management are prized, mechanism 
takes priority over purpose because the levers of power over nature lie in knowledge of 
mechanisms and their controls. This is why science—society’s chief tool of control—is 
strongly reductionist, why physics gets the big research grants, why molecular biology is 
preferred to ecology. 
Applying Feibleman’s logic to people within Earth’s ecosystems, the mechanisms of 
human beings are disclosed through anatomy and physiology, through internal form and 
function. Thus medicine promises to cure diseases and set everyone right by 
manipulations at the organ, tissue, cellular and DNA levels. The purpose of the human 
being must be found ecologically, in the role played vis-à-vis ecosystems and the 
ecosphere, not in the narrower roles played vis-à-vis family, ethnic group or society-at-
large. By analogy with the heart-body relationship, the purpose of people is to keep Earth 
healthy, sustaining life at the global level. Roszak (1992) champions this ecological view, 
suggesting the corollary: human health, mental and physical, depends on establishing a 
right relationship with Earth. 
The conclusions in shorthand form: Earth before organisms. Ecosystems before people. 
Ecosphere not biosphere. Ecocentrism not biocentrism. Ecodiversity not biodiversity. 
These beliefs are arguably based in “science.” I take them to be empirical truths whose 
implications go well beyond present abilities to put them into practice, yet with power to 
command philosophical commitment and modify political policies and actions. Perhaps 
they will never counteract the grandiose self-deception that sets Homo sapiens apart from 
all other species. But at the least they should help in subverting the cultural 
anthropocentrism and individual selfism that plague the human race. 
Ethics by Extension or Ethical Ecosphere? 
As heirs to several centuries of rampant individualism—culminating today in the frenetic 
pursuit of self-esteem and personal authenticity—most of us will be burdened throughout 
our lives with an indissoluble kernel of egocentrism and, by extension, anthropocentrism. 
This should not deter people of good will from proclaiming the truth that, relative to 
Earth, humanity is not the center. A few centuries ago, with some reluctance, people 
admitted that the planets, sun and stars did not circle around their abode. One hundred 
years ago intelligent people likewise admitted that, yes, humans are not specially created 
but are sister and brother to the animals. In short, our thoughts and concepts though 
irreducibly anthropomorphic need not be anthropocentric. 
Wherever our sense of greatest importance lies, there also will our ethics be. The attempt 
to build ethical concern for the ecosphere from the inside out, by add-ons starting with 
our own self importance and that of the human race, may soothe consciences for a little 
while, but it will be the kiss of death for wild nature. Aldo Leopold has been the 
influential exponent of ethics-by-extension, rationalized as a Darwinian expedient for 
human survival. Unfortunately this approach only strengthens anthropocentrism, making 
it certain that land, air, water and other organisms will always in the crunch take second 
place to the welfare of self, family and friends. More sensible, but more difficult, is the 
ecocentric ethic that confers highest valuation on the eco sphere which, by proxy, 
bestows ethical merit and concern on its subsidiary contents according to their 
compliance and cooperation. The self finds its ecological values in the welfare of the non-
self. Thus ecological ethics—guidelines for human behavior here on Earth—are 
derivative, founded in care for Earth and all its contents (Rowe 1990).
The Deep Ecology Platform 
From the Earth-ethic perspective and for purposes of discussion the first four articles of 
the Deep Ecology Eight-Point Platform (Drengson & Inoue 1995) are revisited, with 
explanatory comments. 
1. “The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in 
themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of 
the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.” 
Rephrase: The well-being and flourishing of the living Earth and its many 
organic/inorganic parts have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent 
value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human 
purposes. 
Comment: If the idea of the living Earth is stressed, people may in time come to look on 
“their environments” as alive, deserving the same attention, affection and care as 
charismatic animals and plants. 
2. “Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realizations of these values & 
are also values in themselves.” 
Rephrase: Richness and diversity of Earth’s ecosystems, as well as the organic forms that 
they nurture and support, contribute to the realization of these values & are also values in 
themselves. 
Comment: In ecological parlance, diversity includes richness (number of different things, 
such as species, per unit area) as one of its dimensions, though the two are usefully paired 
for emphasis. A “marsh/duck” example may explain the suggested change. Over long 
evolutionary time, marsh ecosystems brought forth ducks as well as a swarm of other 
semi-aquatic organisms. From this the argument follows that diversity of marsh 
ecosystems is more important than the diversity of ducks; marshes can exist without 
ducks but ducks (now in decline), cannot exist without marshes. Similarly, people in 
today’s unconscionable numbers are decreased (qualitatively if not yet quantitatively) as 
their thoughtless activities ravish the diversity of Earth’s ecosystems. 
3. “Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
human needs.” 
Rephrase: Humans have no right to reduce the diversity of Earth’s ecosystems and their 
vital constituents, organic and inorganic. 
Comment: The original ending phrase, except to satisfy vital human needs,” might be 
interpreted as a giveaway. Satisfying human needs must be balanced against maintaining 
ecodiversity. For example, the conventional practices of industrial agriculture destroy 
ecosystem diversity (destroying richness of species, richness of soil types, richness of 
minor landforms, richness of water regimes). Such practices can only be justified, if at all, 
by the preservation of large areas of native grassland, woodland, and wetland 
representative of each agricultural region’s natural suite of ecosystems. At reasonable 
population levels (a world of less than one billion people), vital human needs could be 
satisfied without obliterating all the sun-powered prairies, rain forests, coral reefs, etc., 
with their evolving organic/inorganic constituents. 
4. “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of 
human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.” 
Rephrase: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial 
decrease of human population. The creative flourishing of Earth and its multitudinous 
nonhuman parts, organic and inorganic, requires such a decrease. 
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